Working papers:
— When Candidate Exclusion Is Viewed as Unfair: Survey Experimental Evidence from Russian Elections. When information about opposition candidates’ popularity is available, their exclusion from authoritarian elections—even under seemingly plausible pretexts—is likely to raise strong suspicions of manipulation among a substantial number of moderate regime supporters, though not among most loyal pro-government voters. However, a portion of the latter group may still develop at least some uncertainty about the fairness of excluding viable candidates. Submitted for review.
— Detecting Clone Candidates: An Approach Using Electoral and Biographical Data (with Ekaterina Paustyan). Thousands of clone candidates—individuals posing as real politicians to siphon votes from them—have been fielded in elections in Ukraine, Russia, India, and other countries. Drawing on publicly available electoral and biographical data, this paper introduces a method for identifying clones without over-relying on often unavailable and error-prone media reports. Submitted for review [access dataset].
— Explaining Clone Candidates’ Electoral Performance: Evidence from Ukraine (with Ekaterina Paustyan). In Ukraine’s parliamentary elections, clone candidates have tended to siphon more votes from their targets (real politicians whom they impersonate) in more rural electoral districts and when listed above them on the ballot. These findings suggest that more educated voters with better access to quality media, who are more likely to reside in urban areas, are more likely to demonstrate greater resilience to electoral manipulation.
— What Drives the Scale of Pro-Government Mass Mobilization in Autocracies (with Kristin Eichhorn). Without access to extensive infrastructural resources, authoritarian regimes may struggle to organize rallies in their own support—an effort that can be instrumental during elections. The analysis shows that such mobilizations tend to be especially large in countries with a strong state presence in the economy and where sizeable groups of university students and schoolteachers lack organizational autonomy.
— Detecting Clone Candidates: An Approach Using Electoral and Biographical Data (with Ekaterina Paustyan). Thousands of clone candidates—individuals posing as real politicians to siphon votes from them—have been fielded in elections in Ukraine, Russia, India, and other countries. Drawing on publicly available electoral and biographical data, this paper introduces a method for identifying clones without over-relying on often unavailable and error-prone media reports. Submitted for review [access dataset].
— Explaining Clone Candidates’ Electoral Performance: Evidence from Ukraine (with Ekaterina Paustyan). In Ukraine’s parliamentary elections, clone candidates have tended to siphon more votes from their targets (real politicians whom they impersonate) in more rural electoral districts and when listed above them on the ballot. These findings suggest that more educated voters with better access to quality media, who are more likely to reside in urban areas, are more likely to demonstrate greater resilience to electoral manipulation.
— What Drives the Scale of Pro-Government Mass Mobilization in Autocracies (with Kristin Eichhorn). Without access to extensive infrastructural resources, authoritarian regimes may struggle to organize rallies in their own support—an effort that can be instrumental during elections. The analysis shows that such mobilizations tend to be especially large in countries with a strong state presence in the economy and where sizeable groups of university students and schoolteachers lack organizational autonomy.
Work in progress:
— Pro-Government Election Rallies and Perceptions of Regime Popularity: Evidence from Russia.
— Who Votes for Kremlin-Backed Spoilers and Clones? The Role of Education (with Ekaterina Paustyan).
— How Autocrats’ Relations with China Shape Their Legitimacy: The Case of Belarus.
— Who Votes for Kremlin-Backed Spoilers and Clones? The Role of Education (with Ekaterina Paustyan).
— How Autocrats’ Relations with China Shape Their Legitimacy: The Case of Belarus.